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Abstract
In this paper we provide a first analysis of the research questions that arise
when dealing with the problem of communicating pieces of formal argumenta-
tion through natural language interfaces. It is a generally held opinion that formal
models of argumentation naturally capture human argument, and some preliminary
studies have focused on justifying this view. Unfortunately, the results are not only
inconclusive, but seem to suggest that explaining formal argumentation to humans
is a rather articulated task. Graphical models for expressing argumentation-based
reasoning are appealing, but often humans require significant training to use these
tools effectively. We claim that natural language interfaces to formal argumenta-
tion systems offer a real alternative, and may be the way forward for systems that
capture human argument.
1 Introduction
Our aim here is to explore the challenges that we need to face when thinking about
natural language interfaces to formal argumentation. Dung [Dung, 1995] states that
formal argumentation “captures naturally the way humans argue to justify their solu-
tions to many social problems.” This is one of the most common claims used to support
research in formal argumentation. More recently there have been a number of em-
pirical studies to investigate this claim [Rahwan and Reed, 2009, Cerutti et al., 2014,
Rosenfeld and Kraus, 2016a, Rosenfeld and Kraus, 2016b]. The results, however, have
been far from conclusive.
The use of graphical models to represent arguments is the most common approach
used in the formal argumentation community to capture argument structures. This has
been successfully applied in a number of real world situations: Laronge [Laronge, 2012]
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(an American barrister and researcher), for example, describes how he used argumen-
tation graphs during trials. Despite this, our claim is that to produce and to consume a
graphical representation of a structure of arguments there is need for significant levels
of training.
Instead of training users on another (graphical) language for representing argu-
ment structures, we can leverage our societal model, through which we are trained in
reading and writing; that is, using natural language. We claim that natural language
representations of formal argumentation are the way forward to develop formal models
that capture human argumentation. In this paper we investigate one aspect of natural
language interfaces to formal argumentation: moving from formal arguments to nat-
ural language text by exploiting Natural Language Generation (NLG) systems. We
ground our investigation on an existing example (Section 2) from collaboration be-
tween the BBC and the Dundee argumentation group [Lawrence et al., 2012], namely
an excerpt of the BBC Radio 4 Moral Maze programme from 22nd June 2012. In this
way the reader can always relate to the original piece of text from where our investi-
gation started. The excerpt has been already formalised into an argument network (i.e.
a graph linking together different pieces of information together to display the web of
arguments exchanged). In Figure 1 and in Section 3 we review all the necessary el-
ements for our investigation: the notion of argumentation schemes; how to represent
argument networks in the Argument Interchange Format (AIF); a (simple) approach to
structured argumentation to build arguments and approximate arguments from an AIF
argument network; Dung’s theory of argumentation; and basic elements of NLG.
In NLG one of the most difficult tasks is to determine the communicative goal;
i.e. deciding what we would like to communicate. Therefore, Section 4 is entirely
dedicated to investigating relevant communicative goals in the context of formal argu-
mentation.
The result we wish to achieve in this paper is a blueprint that outlines the com-
plex research questions and their dense interconnections that our community needs to
address in order to identify models that naturally capture human argumentation.
2 Running Example
On 22nd June 2012, in the middle of the European debt crisis, the Moral Maze pro-
gram on BBC Radio 4 addressed the topic of individual and national debt. Among
others, Nick Dearden, director of the Jubilee Debt Campaign, and Claire Fox, from the
Institute of Ideas, were ‘witnesses’ (contributors offering a specific point of view in the
debate) during the program.
What follows is an excerpt that has been analysed to identify the argument net-
work in the dialogue and made available at http://aifdb.org/argview/1724
[Lawrence et al., 2012]. In this paper we focus on the sub-part of the argument network
depicted in Figure 1 and we highlight in the text the elements that contribute to the gen-
eration of such an argument network.
CLAIRE FOX: I understand that. I suppose my concern is just this: I want the
freedom to be able to write off debts but — I’m sure you recognise this —
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there is this sort of sense amongst a lot of young people, who just think,
“I want that, so I’ll have that now. Thank you.” And so, if you want the
moral hazard, instead of kind of just going on about the bankers, is there
not a danger that if we just said we’d write off debt, that it actually isn’t
very helpful for our side, for ordinary people, to actually have that? [T1]
There’s no discipline there [T2]. In some ways you need that discipline,
don’t you, to be a saver, to think, “I won’t get into debt?” [T3]
NICK DEARDEN: In some ways I agree with you. If you want the economy to
run smoothly, you have to incentivise certain types of behaviour. [T4] So,
for example in South Korea, in terms of how South Korean grew, it did
incentivise saving, at certain times, by certain economic policies [T5]. On
the other hand, I think what people don’t realise, or only half realise, is the
fact that we have actually written off massive amounts of debt [T6]. But it
certainly isn’t the debts of the people who most need it in society [T7].
3 Background
3.1 Argumentation Schemes
Argumentation schemes [Walton et al., 2008, Walton, 2009] are abstract reasoning pat-
terns commonly used in everyday conversational argumentation, legal, scientific argu-
mentation, etc. Schemes have been derived from empirical studies of human argument
and debate. They can capture traditional deductive and inductive approaches as well
as plausible reasoning. Each scheme has a set of critical questions that represents stan-
dard ways of critically probing into an argument to find aspects of it that are open to
criticism.
For instance, in the dialogue reported in Section 2, part of Nick’s position can be
mapped into an argument from example that has the following structure:
Premise: In this particular case, individual a has property F and also property G.
Conclusion: Therefore, generally, if x has property F, the it also has property G.
One of the critical questions here is: “Is the proposition claimed in the premise in
fact true?”
3.2 Representing an Argument Network
The Argument Interchange Format (AIF) [Chesnevar et al., 2006, Rahwan and Reed, 2009]
is the current proposal for a standard notation for argument structures. It is based on a
graph that specifies two types of nodes: information nodes (or I-nodes) and scheme
nodes (or S-nodes). These are represented by two disjoint sets, NI Y NS “ N
and NI X NS “ H, where information nodes represent claims, premises, data, etc.,
and scheme nodes capture the application of patterns of reasoning belonging to a set
S “ SR Y SC Y SP , SR X SC “ SC X SP “ SP X SR “ H. Reasoning patterns
can be of three types: rule of inference SR; criteria of preference SP ; and criteria of
conflicts SC .
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if you want the moral hazard,
instead of kind of just going
on about the bankers, is there
not a danger that if we just
said we’d write off debt,
that it actually isn’t very
helpful for our side, for
ordinary people, to actually
have that?
There’s no discipline there
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In some ways you need that
discipline, don’t you, to be
a saver, to think, “I
won’t get into debt”?
If you want the economy to run
smoothly, you have to
incentivise certain types of
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incentivise saving, at certain
times, by certain economic
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Example
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only half realise, is the fact
that we have actually written
off massive amounts of debt
SignFromOtherEvents
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debts of the people who most
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[T5]
[T4]
[T6]
[T3]
[T2]
[T1]
[T7]
Figure 1: Argument network for the running example, as obtained from http://
aifdb.org/argview/1724 (edited version)
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The relation fulfils Ď NS ˆ S expresses that a scheme node instantiates a partic-
ular scheme. Scheme nodes, moreover, can be one of three types: rule of inference
application nodes NRAS ; preference application nodes NPAS ; or conflict application
nodes NCAS , with S “ NRAS YNPAS YNCAS , and NRAS XNPAS “ NPAS XNCAS “
NCAS XNRAS “ H.
Nodes are connected by edges whose semantics is implicitly defined by their use.
For instance, an information node connected to a RA scheme node, with the arrow ter-
minating in the latter, would suggest that the information node serves as a premise for
an inference rule. Figure 1 shows an AIF representation of the arguments exchanged in
the dialogue introduced in Section 2. Rectangular nodes represent information nodes,
while rhombic ones represent scheme nodes: green for RA nodes, and red for CA
nodes.
3.3 Deductive Argumentation
Using deductive argumentation means that each argument is defined using a logic, and
in the following we adopt the simple, but elegant logic proposed by Besnard & Hunter
[Besnard and Hunter, 2014]. Thus, we let L be a logical language. If α is an atom in
L, then α is a positive literal in L , and α is a negative literal in L. For a literal β, the
complement of the positive literal β “ α is β “  α (resp. if β “  α is not a positive
literal, its complement is the positive literal β “ α).
A simple rule is of the form α1 ^ . . . ^ αk Ñ β where α1, . . . , αk, β are literals.
A simple logical knowledge base is a set of literals and a set of simple rules. Given a
simple logic knowledge base, ∆, the simple consequence relation $s is defined, such
that ∆ $s β if and only if there is a rule α1^ . . .^αn Ñ β P ∆ and @i either αi P ∆
or ∆ $s αi. Now, given Φ Ď ∆ and a literal α, x∆, αy is a simple argument if and only
if Φ $s α and EΦ1 Ĺ Φ such that Φ1 $s α. Φ is the support (or premises, assumptions)
of the argument, and α is the claim (or conclusion) of the argument. Given an argument
a “ xΦ, αy, the function Supportpaq returns Φ, and Claimpaq returns α.
For simple arguments a and b we consider the following types of simple attack:
• a is a simple undercut of b if there is a simple rule α1 ^ αk Ñ β in Supportpbq
and there is an αi P tα1, . . . , αku such that Claimpaq is the complement of αi;
• a is a simple rebut of b if Claimpaq is the complement of Claimpbq.
Following Black & Hunter [Black and Hunter, 2012], an approximate argument is
a pair xΦ, αy. If Φ $s α, then xΦ, αy is also valid; if Φ &s K, then xΦ, αy is also
consistent; if Φ $s α, and there is no Φ1 Ĺ Φ such that Φ1 $s α, then xΦ, αy is also
minimal; if Φ $s α, and Φ &s K, then xΦ, αy is also expansive (i.e. it is valid and
consistent, but it may have unnecessary premises).
Building on top of Figure 1 and transforming each NRAS node into a simple rule, a
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simple knowledge base for our running example is:
∆m “
$’’’’&’’’’%
[T1], [T2], [T3], [T4], [T5],
[T5] Ñ [T4],
[T4] Ñ [T3],
[T2]^ [T3] Ñ [T1],
[T6]^ [T7] Ñ [T3]
,////.////-
Therefore, the following are the simple arguments that can be built from ∆m:
Am “
$’’&’’%
a “ xt[T5], [T5] Ñ [T4]u, [T4]y,
b “ xt[T4], [T4] Ñ [T3]u[T3]y,
c “ xt[T2], [T3], [T2]^ [T3] Ñ [T1]u, [T1]y,
d “ xt[T6], [T7], [T6]^ [T7] Ñ [T3]u, [T3]y
,//.//-
with d rebutting b, and d undercutting c.
However, there are many more approximate arguments. For instance, c1 “
xt[T5], [T4], [T3], [T2], [T5] Ñ [T4], [T4] Ñ [T3], [T2] ^ [T3] Ñ [T1]u, [T1]y is
an approximate argument in favour of [T1] taking into consideration all the inferences
that might help concluding it. Conversely, c2 “ xtu, [T1]y is the minimal (invalid)
approximate argument in favour of [T1].
3.4 Abstract Argumentation
An argumentation framework [Dung, 1995] consists of a set of arguments and a binary
attack relation between them.
Definition 1 An argumentation framework (AF ) is a pair Γ “ xA,Ry where A is a
set of arguments and R Ď AˆA. We say that b attacks a iff xb, ay P R, also denoted
as bÑ a. The set of attackers of an argument a will be denoted as a´ fi tb : bÑ au,
the set of arguments attacked by a will be denoted as a` fi tb : a Ñ bu. We also
extend these notations to sets of arguments, i.e. given E,S Ď A, E Ñ a iff Db P E
s.t. b Ñ a; a Ñ E iff Db P E s.t. a Ñ b; E Ñ S iff Db P E, a P S s.t. b Ñ a;
E´ fi tb | Da P E, bÑ au and E` fi tb | Da P E, aÑ bu.
Each argumentation framework, therefore, has an associated directed graph where
the vertices are the arguments, and the edges are the attacks.
The basic properties of conflict–freeness, acceptability, and admissibility of a set
of arguments are fundamental for the definition of argumentation semantics.
Definition 2 Given an AF Γ “ xA,Ry:
• a set S Ď A is a conflict–free set of Γ if E a, b P S s.t. aÑ b;
• an argument a P A is acceptable with respect to a set S Ď A of Γ if @b P A s.t.
bÑ a, D c P S s.t. cÑ b;
• a set S Ď A is an admissible set of Γ if S is a conflict–free set of Γ and every
element of S is acceptable with respect to S, i.e. S Ď FΓpSq.
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Figure 2: The AF Γm for Figure 1 interpreted using deductive argumentation.
An argumentation semantics σ prescribes for anyAF Γ a set of extensions, denoted
as EσpΓq, namely a set of sets of arguments satisfying the conditions dictated by σ. For
instance, here is the definition of preferred (denoted as PR) semantics.
Definition 3 Given an AF Γ “ xA,Ry, a set S Ď A is a preferred extension of Γ, i.e.
S P EPRpΓq, iff S is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set of Γ.
Given a semantics σ, an argument a is said to be credulously accepted w.r.t. σ if a
belongs to at least one σ-extension. a is skeptically accepted w.r.t. σ if a belongs to all
the σ-extensions.
It can be noted that each complete extension S implicitly defines a three-valued
labelling function Lab on the set of arguments: an argument a is labelled in iff a P S;
is labelled out iff D b P S s.t. b Ñ a; and is labelled undec if neither of the above
conditions holds. In the light of this correspondence, argumentation semantics can be
equivalently defined in terms of labellings rather than of extensions [Caminada, 2006,
Baroni et al., 2011].
We can now introduce the concept of the issues of an argumentation framework
whose status is enough to determine the status of all the arguments in the framework
[Gabbay, 2009, Booth et al., 2012, Booth et al., 2014].
Definition 4 Given an AF Γ “ xA,Ry and L the set of all complete labellings of Γ,
for any a, b P A, a ” b iff @Lab P L, Labpaq “ Labpbq; or @Lab P L, (Labpaq “
in ðñ Labpbq “ outq ^ pLabpaq “ out ðñ Labpbq “ in).
The set of arguments in the equivalent class ” is the set of issues of Γ:
EissuespΓq “
"
S Ď A | @xa, by P S ˆ S, a ” b; and
@S1 Ą S, Dxc, dy P S1 ˆ S1, pc ” dq
*
Continuing with our running example, Figure 2 depicts the argumentation frame-
work from Section 3.3 applying deductive argumentation on the argument network of
Figure 1: Γm “ xAm,Rmy “ xta,b, c,du, td Ñ b,b Ñ d,d Ñ cuy.
There are two preferred extensions: EPRpΓmq “ tta,b, cu, ta,duu. Moreover,
tb,du P EissuespΓmq, and if Labpbq “ in, Labpdq “ out (and viceversa).
3.5 Natural Language Generation
A Natural Language Generation (NLG) system requires [Reiter and Dale, 2006]:
• A knowledge source to be used;
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Table 1: Modules and tasks of a NLG system, adapted from [Reiter and Dale, 2006,
Figure 3.1].
Module Content task Structure task
Document planning Content determination Document structuring
Microplanning Lexicalisation
Referring expression generation
Aggregation
Realisation Linguistic realisation Structure realisation
• A communicative goal to be achieved;
• A user model; and
• A discourse history.
In general, the knowledge source is the information about the domain, while the
communicative goal describes the purpose of the text to be generated. The user model
is a characterisation of the intended audience, and the discourse history is a model of
what has been said so far.
An NLG system divides processing into a pipeline [Reiter and Dale, 2006] com-
posed of the three stages described in Table 1. First it determines the content and
structure of a document (document planning); then it looks at syntactic structures and
choices of words that needs to be used to communicate the content chosen in the doc-
ument planning (microplanning). Finally, it maps the output of the microplanner into
text (realisation).
Each stage includes tasks that can be primary concerned with either content or
structure. Document planning requires content determination — deciding what infor-
mation should be communicated in the output document — and document structuring
— how to order the information to be conveyed.
Microplanning requires (1) lexicalisation — deciding what syntactic constructions
our NLG system should use; (2) referring expression generation — how to relate with
entities; and (3) aggregation — how to map the structures created by the document
planning onto linguistic structures such as sentences and paragraphs.
Document planning and microplanning are the most strategic and complex modules
in this pipeline. They focus on identifying the communicative goal and how it relates
to the user model, thus producing the blueprint of the document that will be generated.
It is the responsibility of the document planning module, in particular of the doc-
ument structuring task, to consider the rhetorical relations (or discourse relations) that
hold between messages or groups of messages. For instance, Rhetorical Structure The-
ory (RST) [Mann and Thompson, 1988] stresses the idea that the coherency of a text
depends on the relationships between pairs of text spans (an uninterrupted linear in-
terval of text) a nucleus and a satellite. In [Mann and Thompson, 1988] a variety of
relationships are provided, but for the purpose of this work, we focus on:
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Evidence The nucleus contains a claim, while the satellite(s) contain(s) evidence sup-
porting such a claim.
Justify The nucleus contains a claim, while the satellite(s) contain(s) justification for
such a claim.
Antithesis Nucleus and satellite are in contrast.
Finally, once the more strategical tasks are performed, there is need for linguistic
realisation — from abstract representations of sentences to actual text — and structure
realisation — converting abstract structures such as paragraphs and sections into the
mark-up symbols chosen for the document. The realisation module is the most algo-
rithmic in this pipeline, and there are already several implementations for supporting
it, for instance SimpleNLG [Gatt and Reiter, 2009].
In the next section we highlight the cases of document planning and microplanning
we believe are most interesting from an argumentation perspective.
4 Generating Natural Language Interfaces to Formal
Argumentation
Let us now return to our running example to illustrate four relevant communicative
goals. For the moment we are not making any assumptions about the user model, and
we will assume no pre-existing discourse history. Therefore, given that the knowledge
source is fixed, we envisage the following four communicative goals, each of which
raises interesting and challenging questions:
1. Presenting a single argument or an approximate argument;
2. Presenting an entire argument network;
3. Explaining the acceptability status of a single argument or an approximate argu-
ment; and
4. Explaining the extensions, given some semantics.
In the following, we discuss elements of content determination for each of these
goals; i.e. deciding what messages should be included in the document to be generated.
Examples will be provided based on our running example. In parts, the generated texts
will sound a little awkward because we deliberately chose not to modify the content of
the arguments. We will elaborate on this in Section 5.
4.1 Presenting a Simple or an Approximate Argument
Simple and approximate arguments are composed of premises and a claim. There are
two main strategies traditionally adopted to represent such a construct:
• forward writing, from premises to claim;
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• backward writing,1 from claim to premises.
Let us consider the argument b “ xt[T4], [T4] Ñ [T3]u, [T3]y. In the case of
forward writing, we can write something like:
If you want the economy to run smoothly, you have to incentivise cer-
tain type of behaviour. [T4] In some ways you need that discipline, don’t
you, to be a saver, to think, “I won’t get into debt”?. [T3]
An explicit signal such as Therefore can be used to highlight the Justify relation:
If you want the economy to run smoothly, you have to incentivise cer-
tain type of behaviour. [T4]
Therefore In some ways you need that discipline, don’t you, to be a
saver, to think, “I won’t get into debt”?. [T3]
Similarly in the case of backward writing, we may write:
In some ways you need that discipline, don’t you, to be a saver, to
think, “I won’t get into debt”?. [T3]
Indeed If you want the economy to run smoothly, you have to incen-
tivise certain type of behaviour. [T4]
More interesting is the case of considering an approximate argument. Assuming
that the communicative goal here is not to confuse the reader, it is probably reason-
able not to include irrelevant elements in the presentation. Relevance theory may be
seen as an attempt to analyse an essential feature of most human communication: the
expression and recognition of intentions [Grice, 1989, Sperber and Wilson, 2005].
For instance, the First or Cognitive Principle of Relevance proposed by Sperber and
Wilson [Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Sperber and Wilson, 2005] states: Human cogni-
tion tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. Therefore, it would be ev-
idence of poor judgment to expand the argument by considering irrelevant elements.
Unfortunately, defining the concept of relevance in formal argumentation is a non-
trivial task [van Eemeren, F and Grootendorst, 2014, Paglieri and Castelfranchi, 2014].
To take a reasonable starting point, let us adapt the definition of relevant evidence from
the Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence2 to our context. Therefore, an approxi-
mate argument is relevant for an argument if:
1. Its premises have any tendency to make the argument’s conclusion more or less
probable than it would be without them; and
2. It provides additional information that might advance the debate.
Given this (loose) definition of relevance, we could argue that the approximate ar-
gument b1 “ xt[T5], [T5] Ñ [T4], [T4] Ñ [T3]u, [T3]y is relevant for b. Similarly
as before, there are different possibilities to write such a chain of inferences. In addi-
tion, it raises questions related to microplanning: perhaps, we desire to merge together
different pieces such as in the following example using backward writing style.
1Often also named assert-justify.
2https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_401 (on 13/05/2017)
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In some ways you need that discipline, don’t you, to be a saver, to
think, “I won’t get into debt”?. [T3]
Indeed If you want the economy to run smoothly, you have to incen-
tivise certain type of behaviour. [T4] , e.g. in South Korea, in terms of
how South Korean grew, it did incentivise saving, at certain times, by cer-
tain economic policies [T5]
[T4] and [T5] are merged by a comma and e.g. . In this way, we highlight the Ev-
idence relation and identify the connection as an argument from example instead of
forming two independent sentences, which is an aspect traditionally related to mi-
croplanning.
Finally, if we have knowledge that an inference rule fulfils an argumentation scheme,
then we can also map the elements of an argument into such a scheme. For instance,
argument b is classified as an argument by established rule, that is represented by the
following scheme:
Major Premise: If carrying out types of actions including the state of affairs A
is the established rule for x, then (unless the case is an
exception), x must carry out A.
Minor Premise: Carrying out types of actions including state of affairs A is
the established rule for a.
Conclusion: Therefore a must carry out A.
It is interesting to note that the minor premise is left implicit in the formalisation
of our example, and it might be an element that should be highlighted to the user. How
to report an implicit premise may depend on the communicative goal. For example, if
the system is intended for users to improve and make their arguments more explicit we
may generate the text:
In some ways you need that discipline, don’t you, to be a saver, to
think, “I won’t get into debt”?. [T3] Indeed If you want the economy to
run smoothly, you have to incentivise certain type of behaviour. [T4]
although we have no evidence that this is the established rule.
In this case, the fact that there is a lack of the minor premise is added to the gen-
erated text. On the other hand, if the system is intended to report an analysis of a con-
versation, we need to take into account that the premise is implicit as it may be already
known by the participants. Hence, the system could assume that the premise holds, and
generate an explicit sentence and we assume that this is the established rule. Fur-
ther research is, however, needed in understanding how to generate text in case of un-
stated premises (e.g., in case of enthymemes[Walton et al., 2008, Black and Hunter, 2012]).
With similar considerations, we could also include critical questions that have either al-
ready been answered, or that, if answered, could strengthen the argument.
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Figure 3: TheAF Γm for the argument network of Figure 1 interpreted using deductive
argumentation in a bipolar-inspired framework, where the squared arrows represents
generic dependencies based on inferences.
4.2 Presenting an Argument Network
One of the strengths of formal argumentation is its ability to handle conflicts. In the
previous section we focused on how to represent a single argument. However, even in
our small running example, we can note that (1) there are more than one argument; and
(2) there are conflicts among them (Figures 1 and 2).
The simplest strategy for representing an argument network is just to enumerate all
the arguments and to list the conflicts among them, eventually linking that with criti-
cal questions if the information is available (e.g. This counterargument answers
the critical question that states . . . ).
However, we argue that there is a better approach, motivated by the need to satisfy
Grice’s maxim of relation and relevance [Grice, 1975]; i.e. that in a conversation one
needs to be relevant and say things that are pertinent to the discussion. Let us consider
Figure 3 that depicts the Γm argumentation framework (cf. Fig. 2) annotated with
a second, bipolar-inspired [Amgoud et al., 2008],3 binary relation between arguments.
Such a relation is grounded in the original argument network, Figure 1.
Once such an annotated graph is obtained, a line of reasoning annotated together
(e.g. xa,b, cy in Figure 3) could be merged together in order to provide a single ap-
proximate argument. Once all the lines of reasoning annotated together are identified
and merged, then we need a strategy to order their presentation; e.g. ordering by length
of each line of reasoning versus ordering by the number of attacks received. We also
need appropriate signals for antithesis relations need to be used. For instance:
if you want the moral hazard, instead of kind of just going on about the
bankers, is there not a danger that if we just said we’d write off debt, that
it actually isn’t very helpful for our side, for ordinary people, to actually
have that? [T1] Indeed There’s no discipline there [T2] and In some
ways you need that discipline, don’t you, to be a saver, to think, “I won’t
get into debt”?. [T3] Indeed If you want the economy to run smoothly,
you have to incentivise certain type of behaviour. [T4] , e.g. in South
Korea, in terms of how South Korean grew, it did incentivise saving, at
certain times, by certain economic policies [T5] However, people don’t
3By bipolar-inspired we intend that such a relation does not represent conflicts. At the same time, how-
ever, we are not in the position to argue that it would be a relationship of support.
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Figure 4: Dispute tree to prove that c is credulously accepted w.r.t. preferred seman-
tics in the AF Γm for the argument network of Figure 1 interpreted using deductive
argumentation.
realise, or only half realise, is the fact that we have actually written off
massive amounts of debt [T6] and But it certainly isn’t the debts of the
people who most need it in society [T7].
4.3 Explaining the Acceptability Status of a Single Argument or
an Approximate Argument
Two of the traditional decision problems in abstract argumentation [Dunne and Wooldridge, 2009]
are checking whether an argument is credulously or skeptically accepted (or not). An
interested user might select one of the arguments (or one of the propositions in the
argument network) and ask whether or not it is credulously or skeptically accepted.
To answer such a query, we can exploit research in proof theory and argument
games [Modgil and Caminada, 2009]. For instance, to prove that c (in Figure 2) is
credulously accepted according to preferred semantics, we can (1) compute the exten-
sions; and (2) compute the dispute tree [Modgil and Caminada, 2009] needed to prove
it. The dispute tree is depicted in Figure 4 which suggests that only the argument
network comprising c, d, and b needs to be considered.
4.4 Explaining Extensions
Explaining multiple extensions is analogous to present different argumentation
(sub-)networks that are linked together by attacks. Therefore, the solution for this
communication goal builds upon the procedures envisaged in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
It is worth mentioning that a possible way to identify the attack connections be-
tween those extensions is to consider a set of arguments belonging to a set of issues
S P EissuespΓq such that |S| “ |EσpΓq| for the chosen σ semantics.4 Those arguments
could nicely provide foci of attention: for instance, tb,du P EissuespΓmq. There-
fore, the text presented in Section 4.2 could be adapted in a straightforward manner to
communicate the existence of two preferred extensions that gravitate around the issue
tb,du.
4Assuming that the semantics can be related to the notion of a complete labelling (Def. 4).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper have we provided a blueprint for a complex set of research questions
that arise when considering how to generate natural language representations of formal
argumentation structures.
First of all, as already noted at the beginning of Section 4, we assume neither a
model of the user, nor pre-existing contexts that need to be referenced in the piece of
text generated. These elements will need to be addressed in future research.
Moreover some pieces of generated text sound quite awkward. To address such
an issue, each piece of information inserted in an argument network should represent
a single text-agnostic normal form proposition. In this way, we could compose them
in a way in a meaningful way. This is clearly a constraint that might be unnatural if
an untrained user tries to generate an argument network, and this raises an interesting
research question concerning how to enable untrained users to formalise their lines of
reasoning.
It is worth noting that the research questions highlighted in this paper have been
grounded on a piece of argumentation formalised from a discussion between humans.
We claim neither that our list is exhaustive nor that it is applicable to all possible ar-
gument networks. For instance, providing a natural language interface to an argument
network built by an expert might lead to different, unforeseen, communicative goals.
For instance, related research enabling the scrutiny of autonomous systems by allowing
agents to generate plans through argument and dialogue [Tintarev et al., 2013] had the
specific communication goal of justifying the purpose of each step within a plan.
Moreover we support the effort of extending AIF to include additional informa-
tion: for instance, the AIFdb [Lawrence et al., 2012] project extends the AIF model
to include schemes: of rephrasing; of locution describing communicative intentions
which speakers use to introduce propositional contents; and of interaction or protocol
describing relations between locutions. Dealing with those pieces of information raise
further research questions. Indeed, as we saw in Section 3.3, arguments a, b, and c
form a conflict-free set, and in Section 4 we often considered them altogether in an
approximate argument. However, while argument c was put forward by Claire Fox
in the original dialogue (Section 2), arguments a and b belong to Nick Dearden. The
question here is how to include the sources of those arguments in the generated natural
language text. In the use of argumentation to support reasoning and intelligence anal-
ysis [Toniolo et al., 2015], sources are also important, but this is only one aspect of the
provenance of an argument that could, in general, be considered.
Finally, we will investigate the potential of applying NLG to existing systems using
formal argumentation in real-world applications, such as CISpaces [Toniolo et al., 2015]
— a system for collaborative intelligence analysis — and ArgMed [Hunter and Williams, 2012,
Williams et al., 2015] — a system for reasoning about the results of clinical trials.
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